Abstract. Given is the outcome s of S ∼ B(n, p) (n known, p fully unknown) and two numbers 0 < a ≤ b < 1. Required are probabilities α < (s), α a,b (s), and α > (s) of the hypotheses H < : p < a, H a,b : a ≤ p ≤ b, and H > : p > b, such that their sum is equal to 1. The degenerate case a = b(= c) is of special interest. A method, optimal with respect to a class of functions, is derived under Neyman-Pearsonian restrictions, and applied to a case from medicine.
Introduction
In this paper, we propose a method to assign probabilities to hypotheses concerning p in the context of binomial hypothesis testing. Given is the result S = s of n successive i.i.d. Bernoulli(p) trials, with no prior information whatsoever about the location of p in = [0, 1]. We assign a number α < (s) to the hypothesis H < : p < a, as a principle-dependent estimate of the truth value 1 [0,a) (p) of H < : p < a and extend this approach to assigning numbers α < (s), α a,b (s) , and α > (s) to hypotheses H < : p < a, H a,b : a ≤ p ≤ b, and H > : p > b. A method of inference, under the restriction that the sum of these probabilities is equal to one, is given in Section 5.
Our approach comprises of the following steps. We estimate the indicator function of the hypothesis of interest under the so-called restriction of weak unbiasedness. Finding the optimal estimate is done through minimising a proper integrated risk function, in this paper the quadratic one. As such, our approach synthesises the testing and estimation contexts. Our method is compared with other methods currently en vogue.
Historical context
Jacob Bernoulli (1713) had established that the possibility of a ≤ s n ≤ b is, in his words, "morally certain" if n is sufficiently large and p is such that a ≤ p − 0.01 and b ≥ p + 0.01. He proved that the probability of the event {a ≤ n −1 S ≤ b} can 128 C. J. Albers, O. J. W. F. Kardaun and W. Schaafsma be made arbitrarily close to 1 by choosing n sufficiently large. To apply his result, p has to be known. Thomas Bayes (1763) thought about the inverse problem where p is unknown but the outcome s is known and the probability of a ≤ p ≤ b has to be specified. He would have regarded the hypothesis H a,b as "morally certain" if its "probability" is larger than 0.999, say. How to specify such kind of "probability," that is the question. Considering the degenerate case a = b(= c) of a null hypothesis, Karl Pearson (1900) raised the idea that P = P(χ 2 1 ≥ (s − nc) 2 /(nc(1 − c))) is a fairly reasonable criterion for the probability that H 0 : p = c is true.
Bayesians emphasise that the probabilities α < (s), α a,b (s) and α > (s) are "assessments of probability which should correspond to posterior probabilities". In the mid-eighties, Berger and coworkers (see, e.g., Berger (2003) ) emphasised that p-values and posterior probabilities tend to be considerably different, an issue known since quite some time. This motivated the last author to initiate the idea of estimating truth values with respect to (w.r.t.) squared-error loss (Schaafsma (1989) ). This idea gained popularity after a series of publications by, mainly, Hwang and Casella (such as Hwang et al. (1992) , Hwang and Yang (2001) ).
Principles behind the estimation of truth values
Given some hypothesis H about p, for example, the hypothesis H a,b : a ≤ p ≤ b, which estimator α: {0, 1, . . . , n} → [0, 1] should we use for estimating 1 H (p)? Let = [0, 1] denote the set of theoretical possibilities θ for the true value p and let H denote the set of all θ for which H is true and let A denote that where H is false (i.e., its logical negation A is true). Let X θ ∼ B(n, θ ) denote any random variable (having the same distribution as S ∼ B(n, p) only if p = θ ). Classical statisticians will start out by studying the bias function
given an estimator α, using notation 1 H = 1 H . The requirement of unbiasedness, that is, B(θ, α) = 0 for all θ , cannot be satisfied because Eα(X θ ) is a continuous function of θ whereas 1 H is not. As replacement, we advocate to require weak unbiasedness, that is, Subsequently, thinking in terms of estimation errors, the classical statistician may choose some loss function. We suggest L(θ, a) = (a − 1 H (θ )) 2 such that the risk function corresponds to the mean squared error
This paper is based on squared-error loss because of its simplicity and properness. Some results, however, can easily be generalised to proper loss functions in general (see below). It is here that, in our view, classical statisticians should accept arguments from their Bayesian colleagues implying that, for example, absolute-error loss is "improper" which is a reason to avoid its use in estimating truth values.
Remark on properness
Savage (1951) advocated thinking in terms of a utility function U(θ, a) instead of a loss function L(θ, a). He also noted that, given such utility function, a loss function is obtained by specifying L(θ, a) = (sup a U(θ, a)) − U(θ, a) as the regret w.r.t. the utility of the most profitable action. To be acceptable in the elicitation of probabilities, that is, estimation of truth values, the utility function should be proper in the sense that, in our special context of estimating 1 H (t), the expected utility EU(T , a) is maximal as a function of a iff a = P(T ∈ H ), no matter the choice of the distribution of random variable T . The class of (strictly) proper utility functions is extremely large, much larger than the ones of the form
which will be discussed here. By definition, the properness requirement is satisfied iff pf H (a) Another proper loss function is the logarithmic one
Quadratic loss and logarithmic loss are mathematically attractive, for example, because L(θ, a) is convex as a function of a and constant as a function of θ on H and A , respectively. Moreover, they are "fair" in the sense that nothing changes if H is replaced by A and a by 1 − a. Our experiences based on quadratic loss are not much different from those based on logarithmic loss, when the probabilities and their assignments stay away from being close to 0 or 1 (Kardaun and Schaafsma (2015) ). 
The Bayesian will regard 1 0 R(θ, α) dθ as the Bayes risk w.r.t. Bayes' prior; the non-Bayesian considers this integral as the area under the risk function.
In the degenerate case a = b = c of testing H 0 : p = c the value α Bayes (x) assigned to H 0 is equal to 0 for all x. The consequence Eα Bayes (X c ) = 0 is in obvious conflict with the weak-unbiasedness requirement. In many situations, nobody will believe that p is exactly equal to some predetermined value c. In these cases, some dogmatism is involved in the requirement of weak unbiasedness. In other practical situations, it is very well possible that p is exactly equal to, for example, c = 1 2 . The Bayesian will assign a positive prior probability ρ to this possibility and modify α Bayes accordingly. The choice ρ = 1 2 of the "unbiased Bayesian" is somewhat dogmatic as well. Some Bayesians suggest to leave the choice of ρ to the problem-owner who, hence, can compute "his own" posterior probability. We prefer to choose ρ such that the corresponding Bayes estimator is weakly similar (see Section 6).
3 Testing H 0 : p = c by assigning a q-value Pearson (1900) claimed (for situations much more general than the present one) that the p-value
provides a "fairly reasonable" criterion for the probability that the data can be considered as having arisen from random sampling. Fisher suggested to use the "exact" p-value
where, here and in the sequel,
In the Neyman-Pearson interpretation, the p-value is defined as the smallest value of the nominal level of significance for which H 0 is rejected. Modern statisticians, Bayesians (e.g., Berger (2003)) as well as non-Bayesians (e.g., Lehmann (1959) ), reject the idea to regard p-values as posterior probabilities.
It is in line with Section 2 to construct an estimator α: {0, 1, . . . , n} → [0, 1] of the true value 1 {c} (p) of the indicator function 1 {c} : → {0, 1} of H 0 such that α is (in some sense) optimal with respect to squared-error loss, that is,
The requirement of weak unbiasedness is satisfied if and only if Eα(X c ) ≥ The requirement of weak unbiasedness is in exact agreement with Lehmann's (1959) decision-theoretic concept of unbiasedness if squared-error loss is replaced by absolute-error loss. We are somewhat critical w.r.t. the mathematical niceties involved. Continuity of the mean squared error is quite restrictive. For a wellestablished null-hypothesis H 0 , for instance, the probability c of selecting a random digit from the SETUN computer (which used ternary logic, cf. Rescher (1969)) being 1 3 , one would like to suppress R(c, α) by allowing Eα(X c ) to be somewhat larger than 1 2 . This is at the cost of an increase of R θ,α for θ = c. This may be acceptable as many of these are comparatively small. In other situations, when H 0 is more arbitrary, it may be preferable to increase R(c, α) in order to reduce R(θ, α) for θ = c.
Theorem 1. The problem of minimising
under the restrictions 
is a consequence of
(Apply the local form of the CLT.) Theorem 1 can easily be generalised to the situation where the restriction Eα(X c ) = 
2 . This provides
where λ is such that the equality constraint is satisfied. Figure 1 presents graphs of the two-sided q-value of α * and of the one-sided q-value α (λ = 1.0345, following from a numerical analysis employing the bisection method) both for testing H 0 : p = c in case c = 1 2 and n = 12. These graphs specify the entire "Bayes-optimal weakly-similar" method of inference. directly derived by calculating the coefficient of x 0 of (x +1/x) 2n = ((x +1/x) n ) 2 , see, for example, Greene and Knuth (1982 and than half of it, that is, 0.019, respectively.
Discussion
The differences between optimal q-values and the corresponding p-values are not very alarming in this example.
Testing H < : p < c by assigning a q-value
It is often practically impossible that p is exactly equal to c (see Section 6 for a counter example). In such situations, we may try to estimate 1 [0,c) (p) or 1 [0,c] (p) w.r.t. squared-error loss. First, we note that the unrestricted minimisation 
Settling a crucial issue
Whether one uses p-values or optimal q-values, the estimates α < (s), α 0 (s) and α > (s) of 1 [0,c) (p), 1 {c} (p) and 1 (c,1] (p) derived in Sections 3 and 4 are not probabilistically coherent because their sum 1 + α 0 (s) is larger than 1. This lack of probabilistic coherency is not something to worry about too much if α 0 (s) is very small, as it will be in the case of Section 6. Nor is it of interest if utilisations are discussed based on choosing a decision d such that some expectation To arrive at a specific solution, we concentrate attention on an integrated risk, for example, 1 0 R(θ, α) dθ where α = (α < , α a,b , α > ). Bayesians may emphasize that, given any proper loss function (such that inf α 1 0 R(θ, α) dθ < ∞), the integrated risk 1 0 R(θ, α) dθ is minimal if α contains the probabilities prescribed by the Beta(s + 1, n − s + 1) distribution. A drawback of this approach is that α a,b (s) will be tiny (i.e., "incredibly" small) if b − a is very small (or even 0, if a = b(= c)). This shows that the Bayesian has to replace Bayes' prior by something else depending on a and b (see the beginning of this section). We concentrate attention on the proper loss function
(which has its origin in Epstein (1969) ) and restrict attention to the class of Lehmann-unbiased rules α = (α < , α > ). This condition is satisfied if and only if α < is a weakly-unbiased estimator of 1 [0,a) (p) and α > is a weakly-unbiased estimator of 1 (b,1] (p). It can be established, for any w > 0 that Beta(s + 1, n − s) has its origin in Kroese (1994) , Kroese et al. (1995) and Salomé (1994) .) The loss function L w allows, under certain conditions, that the task of constructing α < can be separated from the task of constructing α > which is certainly convenient. Strict properness of L w follows from the fact that, if T is some real-valued random variable with P(T < a) = p < , P(a ≤ T ≤ b) = p a,b , and
is minimal as a function of (a < , a > ) iff a < = p < and a > = p > . To avoid the difficulty that α a,b (s) will be tiny if b − a is very small, the Neyman-Pearsonian will be attracted by the idea to impose some restriction on the class of estimators α = (α < , α a,b , α > ), for example, that to the class D 1 ,ψ 2 of rules satisfying
where 
Theorem 2. The Bayes risk
where λ 1 is such that Eα * < (X a ) = ψ 1 , and
where λ 2 is such that Eα * > (X b ) = ψ 2 .
Proof. See the Appendix.
If either ψ 1 or ψ 2 is larger than 1 2 (a theoretical possibility which we consider to be "morally rejectable" as it implies that the risk at a boundary point is smaller than that in its neighbourhood), then in (5.6) and (5.7) 
Practical example and discussion
In 2008, the Dutch Acute Pancreatitis Study Group (Besselink et al. (2008) ) was astounded when they analysed the results of their carefully designed double-blind comparison of "placebo" and "treatment" based on a about 150 patients from each of the two categories. They had assumed that the beneficial effects would outweigh the possible risks of complications for these-severely ill-patients. The interim analysis (at half-way) did not point to any significant difference. In the final analysis they observed s = 9 deaths in the placebo group and t = 24 deaths in the treatment group. A Poisson approximation followed by conditioning w.r.t. n = s + t = 33 (a more precise analysis is discussed in Kardaun and Schaafsma (2015) ) leads us to the problem of discussing truth or falsity of hypotheses like (33, p) , p denoting the probability that a case of death is from the placebo group. The research workers had taken for granted, a priori, that treatment would be beneficial, that is fewer cases of death in the treatment group. Their intention was to ignore the possibility that p < is such that H 0 is rejected at the 5% level. (The UMPU size 5% and UMPI size 5% Neyman-Pearson tests are such that H 0 would even have been rejected if s = 10 and, with some type of randomisation probability, even if s = 11.) To express statistical uncertainty in such accept-reject statement, the neo-Bayesian claim that p-values tend to be misleadingly small whenever they are small. If one computes the posterior probability α Bayes (9) = In this paper, we are fascinated by the idea that 1 c (p) should be estimated w.r.t. squared-error loss. The Bayes-optimal weakly similar q-value α * (9) of Section 3 provides α * ws (9) = (6.3) (Kardaun and Schaafsma (2015) contains several alternative estimators, as well as generalisations and some asymptotic theory. They suggest that the estimate α * ws (9) just obtained is, perhaps, a bit too small because weak similarity is bit too conservative.) A subject-matter remark is that a particularly high mortality rate was found in the subgroup of patients with bowel ischemia, who, all of them, received probiotics. (As described in the paper, this diagnosis was made within two weeks of admission to the hospitals.) From nine of these patients, only one survived. Hence, subtracting the eight patients of this subgroup who did pass away, one gets for the mortality in the non-bowel-ischemia group: (probiotics, placebo|total) = (16, 9|25) instead of (24, 9|33) for the entire group. Therefore, in the absence of ischemia, the statistical significance is considerably less, the hypothesis p = 1 2 is not traditionally rejected at the two-sided 5% level, even based on a simple normal approximation with continuity correction (which can be calculated by hand):
25/4 1.2. As an approximation to P({X ≤ 9} ∪ {X ≥ 16}) this leads to the two-sided p-value P{|Z| > 1.2} = 23% ("exact": 22.95%) instead of 1.5% ("exact" p-value: 1.35%) for the entire group. The weakly-similar q-value (see Theorem 1) gives in this caseα 25 (9) = 25 9 2 24 / 50 25 = 27%. Without any continuity correction, to obtain an approximation of 1 2 (P({X ≤ 9} ∪ {X ≥ 16}) + (P{X < 9} ∪ {X > 16})), one gets Z 1.4 for the (16, 9|25) sub-group and Z 2.6 for the entire group of patients, with corresponding two-sided mid pvalues of 16% and 0.9%, respectively. For some further discussion on continuity correction and mid p-values, see Hirji et al. (1991) and Lancaster (1961) .
Though several subgroup analyses were performed and the two-week survival rates of the patients that did not develop bowel ischaemie was given, the longer term survival ratio was not precisely put under the "candle light" (from Rao (1999) ) in the original article in The Lancet.
Concluding remarks
It is an inconvenient truth that we, mathematical statisticians, advertise our findings using words like optimal, rational, coherent, admissible, unbiased, etc., made specific in mathematical form and, hence, suggesting that anything else is suboptimal, irrational, etc., while there are many reasons to doubt. In this paper, we derived an optimal method to coherently specify estimators α < (s), α 0 (s), α > (s) on basis of a Neyman-Pearsonian choice of two numbers ψ 1 and ψ 2 . Choosing 
Appendix: Proof of Lemma 1
A reference to the fundamental lemma in the q-value approach in Schaafsma et al. (1989) might do. This reference, however, did not provide a full proof (because three different approaches were available). We present an explicit proof for the special situation of this paper. Note that Fubini's theorem provides
we have to solve the optimisation problem
Ignoring the (trivial) inequality constraints, we derive, by writing down a Lagrangian and differentiation w.r.t. α < (s) (s = 0, 1, . . . , n) , that the minimum will be achieved if The first term is nonnegative because ε(s) ≥ 0 and the second term is equal to 0.
